Governing the Borderlands: Decoding the Power of Aid

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This article examines aid practice, that is, the public-private contractual networks that link donor governments, UN agencies, military establishments, NGOs, private companies and others, as a relation of global liberal governance. In order to fulfil this function, such networks embody what could be called the 'securitisation' of international assistance. Based upon ideas of human security and ameliorating the effects of poverty and vulnerability reduction, aid is now seen as playing a direct security role. Rather than being concerned with relations between states, the primary aim of this security paradigm is to modulate and change the behaviour of populations within them. In doing so, it is able to exploit the opportunities afforded by privatisation. At the same time, however, aid as security is confronted by its own particular problem of 'governing at a distance': how can calculations made by leading states be transformed into actions at the global edge when a multitude of private and non-government implementors now intervene? The article concludes by examining the contribution of risk analysis to solving this problem and, especially, the development of new contractual regimes based around technical standardisation, benchmarking and performance auditing. Through such technologies, metropolitan states are learning how to manage the public-private networks of aid practice and, as a result, to govern the borderlands in new ways.

Keywords: global governance, human security, privatisation, risk, conflict.

The increasing influence of non-state and private associations has been an important feature of international relations since the 1970s (Bull, 1977). It is a reflection of the deepening privatisation and marketisation of social and political life. In much of the literature on globalisation, such processes are understood as being responsible for the weakening of nation-states. Because they assume responsibility for aspects of public competence or challenge sovereignty, it has been argued that the growth of non-state associations results in the 'hollowing-out' and enfeeblement of the state. Indeed, we may be witnessing a secular reincarnation of the overlapping and competing private jurisdictions that characterised the medieval world (Bull, 1977). Globalisation is often interpreted as a process whereby states are weakened and enslaved by outside agendas. Add to this the security threats posed by the new wars and one has an international system beset by 'durable disorder'(Cerny, 1998). Contrary to this view, at least in relation to humanitarian aid, it is argued here that privatisation, while generating its own limitations and concerns, has not necessarily been at the expense of metropolitan states. Privatisation and marketisation are synonymous with new discursive practices and technologies of power through which metropolitan states are learning how to

govern anew. In this case, how to govern by projecting authority through non-state actors and the non-territorial networks of international assistance (Duffield, 2001). With its focus on aid in conflict situations, this paper examines some of the basic features of this governmental rationality, especially the links between aid, privatisation and security.

Privatisation and global governance

Over the past quarter-century, leading governments, UN agencies, NGOs and private companies have gained unprecedented access and varying degrees of influence over the internal affairs of many weaker or contested states in the unstable zones of what could be called the global 'borderlands'. The idea of the borderlands, it should be pointed out, does not reflect an empirical reality. It is a metaphor for an imagined geographical space where, in the eyes of many metropolitan actors and agencies, the characteristics of brutality, excess and breakdown predominate. It is a terrain that has been mapped and re-mapped in innumerable aid and academic reports where wars occur through greed and sectarian gain, social fabric is destroyed and developmental gains reversed, non-combatants killed, humanitarian assistance abused and all civility abandoned. At the end of the 1970s, as a means of encouraging acceptable behaviour, external involvement first embraced economic management through the reform policies of the IMF and World Bank. During the 1980s, helped by the expansion of NGO activity, it enlarged to include development and social welfare. In the 1990s, through the emergence of UN system-wide humanitarian interventions, security and governance issues were included within the widening competence of non-state and private associations (Deacon et al., 1997). What is interesting about this evolving metropolitan-borderland relationship is its tendency to enlarge and include ever more areas of public competence and, at the same time, to take on an appearance of permanence.

While the aim remains that of achieving economic and political sustainability, due to the deep-seated nature of the problems encountered, there is a noticeable tendency among international agencies to redefine what were initially regarded as short-term engagements as indefinite programmes (Chandler, 1999). At the same time, there are growing calls for greater comprehensiveness and more coherence between the different actors and policy measures involved (Macrae and Leader, 2000). In what can be described as a significant internationalisation of public policy, privatisation and marketisation, broadly understood, have been central aspects of this deepening engagement. Indeed, if globalisation has any meaning in relation to the borderlands, it is the thickening of international aid networks between metropolitan and borderland areas as opposed to the augmentation of financial, production and technological networks within and between metropolitan regions (Castells, 1996). Without the growing social and political role of private and non-state actors — together with the new forms of public-private partnership and systems of public management that they imply — the internationalisation of public policy could not have taken place.

The increasing involvement of non-state actors in shaping social and political outcomes in the borderlands cannot be understood by just focusing on the technical level of the project or aid programme; that is, by simply asking 'what' questions in relation to the activities of aid agencies. The less visible but more important question is 'how'— rather, what new forms of interaction and dependency have emerged between states and private associations to make their activities both possible and

needed? From this perspective, the internationalisation of public policy is more than a collection of programming initiatives. It would not have been possible without considerable *organisational* innovation. It has required, for example, a significant expansion and deepening complexity of subcontracting arrangements, auditing techniques, partnership frameworks and global compacts linking metropolitan states, multilateral agencies, NGOs and private companies. At the same time, in relation to peacekeeping and social reconstruction, innovative forms of civilian-military interface have emerged in a number of locations (Williams, 1998). Metropolitan public-private networks have now effectively de-coupled major areas of economic, social and political authority from the purview of allegedly sovereign states within the global margins. Such complexes play a governmental role by virtue of this authority and their intention to use it to restore order and development — to reduce poverty, promote economic sustainability and reconstruct civil and political institutions (OECD, 1998). Indeed, it is possible to argue that the networks of international aid are part of an emerging system of global governance. Since the aim of most of the strategic actors involved is to establish functioning market economies and plural polities in the borderlands (World Bank, 1997), one could say that such complexes are the representatives of global *liberal* governance (Dillon and Reid, 1999).

The securitisation of development

In understanding the governmental rationality of privatisation, it is necessary to question why, at an operational level at least, the internationalisation of public policy is dominated by non-state and private associations. In this respect, rather than metropolitan states becoming enfeebled, one has to hold out the possibility that a radical reworking of international authority is taking place. The changing nature of security is central to the increasing governmental rationality of privatisation. Traditionally, state-based security hinged upon maintaining a balance of power between sovereign states. During the cold war, for example, re-armament programmes and changing international political alliances constituted the dominant security regime. It is a good example of state-based security realised through a shifting balance of power. Even before the cold war ended, however, a security system based on political alliance and arms superiority had shown itself vulnerable to non-conventional warfare (Macrae, 2001).

During the 1970s and 1980s, guerrilla movements in places like Vietnam and Afghanistan proved to be more than a match for well-armed Superpowers (van Creveld, 1991). The advent of asymmetrical warfare based upon the intermingling of insurgents and civilians has challenged the military and scientific superiority metropolitan states have hitherto enjoyed. With the ending of the cold war, strategic alliances between metropolitan and Third World states, an important aspect of the former balance of power, also lost their political rationale. Rather than enfeeblement and paralysis, however, out of the crisis of state-based security a new framework has taken shape. This security paradigm is not based upon the accumulation of arms and external political alliances between states, but on changing the conduct of populations within them. Within this new public-private security framework, stability is achieved by activities designed to reduce poverty, satisfy basic needs, strengthen economic sustainability, create representative civil institutions, protect the vulnerable and pro-mote human rights: the name of this largely privatised form of security is *development.*

The modern idea of development first emerged in the troubled conditions of mid-19th-century Europe. It furnished a principle for reconciling the disruption of industrial progress with the need for social order. With its in-built sense of design, development was imbued with the ability to bring stability to the chaos of progress expressed in the rapid urbanisation, unemployment and impoverishment engendered by capitalist expansion (Cowen and Shenton, 1995). In many respects, 'development' has always represented forms of mobilisation associated with order and security. While different strategies and technologies have come and gone, the general aim has remained that of a modernising reconciliation of the inevitability of progress with the need for order; since its inception, it has singularly failed to achieve this objective. During the 1950s and 1960s, both development and security were inter-state affairs. Aid centred on strengthening the state apparatus in the Third World as a means of promoting development and, at the same time, developmental states provided strategic partners in the cold war balance of power. By the end of the 1970s, however, this framework was already in the process of collapse. Apart from the growing dominance of neo-liberal policies, it was becoming evident that developmental states could not maintain security within their own borders. The growing refugee crisis of the time graphically illustrated that this insecurity also had important international implications (Suhrke, 1994).

During the 1980s, a view of state failure in the South leading to a breakdown in development, the spread of conflict and international insecurity began to take shape among metropolitan actors. By the early 1990s, a metropolitan consensus had emerged that instability was the result of a *developmental malaise* (Carnegie Commission, 1997). Poverty, resource competition, environmental collapse and population growth, in the context of failed or predatory state institutions, were seen as fomenting an unprecedented wave of non-conventional internal, regionalised and criminalised forms of conflict. Instead of seeing the South as an arena of strategic competition and alliance, the discursive practices associated with the new public-private security framework have re-mapped the erstwhile Third World in terms of the violent and unpredictable imagery of the borderlands metaphor.

The governmental rationality of privatisation

This changing perception of international security has profound implications for the nature of international governmental rationality. Within a developmental security framework, southern states, except as 'facilitators' or things to be 'reformed' or 'reconstructed', have lost much of their relevance. Sovereignty is now widely argued by donor governments and multilateral agencies alike, to be a conditional status. What has taken the place of sovereignty as the locus of security is the nature and quality of the *domestic relations* within the global margins. The types of economic and social policies being pursued, levels of poverty, the degree of popular participation, the extent of corruption and criminal activity, respect for human rights, the role of women, the status of the media and psychological well-being, have all become areas in which the borderlands *as a social body* have been opened up to levels of metropolitan monitoring, intervention and regulation unprecedented since the colonial period.

The transformation of the Third World from a series of strategic states into a *potentially dangerous* social body forms the basis of current understandings of 'wider' or 'human' security (Boutros-Ghali, 1995 (from 1992)). The social diagnostics associated with ideas of human security constitute the points of intervention where

metropolitan actors attempt to modulate the behaviour of the populations involved. Development is now directly concerned with trying to change the way people think and what they do (World Bank and Carter Center, 1997). Rather than build things or redistribute resources, development is more concerned with getting inside the head to stay the hand. The securitisation of development is consistent with falling levels of total overseas development aid. Even humanitarian assistance is no longer given without the expectation of something back; it too must be developmental. This means that the people concerned — and especially their leaders — must change their conduct and attitudes if they are to be eligible.

The securitisation of development denotes a situation in which the security concerns of metropolitan states have merged with the social concerns of aid agencies; they have become one and the same thing. If poverty and institutional malaise in the borderlands encourage conflict and undermines international stability, then the promotion of development with its intention of eliminating these problems simultaneously operates as a *security strategy*; in the transition to a post-cold war system, aid and politics have been reunited (IDC, 1999). The link between development and security is now a declared position within mainstream aid policy (DFID, 1997; OECD, 1998; IDC, 1999). The blurring of aid and politics has played an important role in encouraging the emergence of public-private networks linking metropolitan governments, NGOs, UN agencies, militaries and private companies. To put it another way, the securitisation of development has been of central importance for legitimising the growing involvement of non-state actors.

Changing the behaviour of borderland populations, although now vital for international security, is beyond the capacity or legitimacy of metropolitan states. Despite the increasing conditionality of sovereignty, apart from a few strategic exceptions, metropolitan governments are usually unwilling or unable to intervene directly in the internal affairs of unstable countries. Mobilising an international response to the fears and threats associated with the borderlands metaphor would have been impossible without a corresponding privatisation of the technologies of development. Only by redefining security as a development problem, that is, as reducible to a series of social or psychological imbalances relating to the economy, health, education and gender, does it become legitimate to divide up and parcel out the borderlands as a social body to the sectoral care of a wide range of specialist non-state and private organisations.

Governing at a distance

Although colonial forms of governmental rationality have long been denounced and rejected, the South has still to gain its independence. Indeed, as a result of globalisation the notion of independence, for metropolitan as well as southern states, now seems somewhat fanciful. Globalisation in the South has largely been manifest in the growing influence of the public-private networks of aid practice. While development is a technology of government — a way of ordering the relationship between people and things to produce a desired outcome — it is different from that of colonialism. This was based on disciplinary technologies based within institutions and forms of territorial authority that, with the important exception of the economy, attempted to leave indigenous social and cultural forms relatively intact; in many cases the 'tribe' or 'caste' was preserved as a unit of administration. Feelings of racial

superiority no doubt helped foster this cultural aloofness. The radicalism of development, especially those technologies emerging since the 1970s, lies in the attempt — fostered by sentiments that we are now all the same — to instigate a wide-ranging cultural revolution that transforms societies as a whole in order to change conduct and make it consistent with the rationalities of liberal modernity (Stiglitz, 1998).

In order to achieve this aim, development has adopted and extended the regulatory techniques of control now found in metropolitan countries (Deleuze, 1995: 177–82). This is not just a simple extension, however. Historically, the global periphery has allowed an idealised or more unfettered environment for the experimental application of emerging metropolitan technologies of government. During the 19th century, the development of institution-based disciplinary technologies (in families, schools, factories, hospitals, prisons and asylums) was helped by the scope for experimentation afforded by the colonies (Rose, 2000: 107–11). Excursions into centralised political administration: public dispensaries; unified police forces; town planning; elementary schools; asylums; the care and discipline of the poor; ordinances for road and bridge repair; model rural villages; and prisons as a site for medical observation were regularly undertaken. Today, something similar can be seen in relation to the development of regulatory technologies that now supplant and contest those of discipline. Regulatory techniques of control create the possibility of modulating the behaviour of populations or countries through controlling processes and networks rather than disciplining individuals per se. The history of structural adjustment and market deregulation in the South is a good example of unaccountable experimentation with an emerging set of liberal technologies of social control. This was a programme of privatisation far more radical, for its time at least, than would have been possible in any Northern country.

Control technologies, whether applied in metropolitan areas or in zones of insecurity, share a number of characteristics. Disciplinary systems attempt to alter the conduct of individuals within the confines of institutions and juridical relations. Control systems, however, as embedded in the public-private networks of aid practice, attempt to alter the wider social context, the web of interactions and the pattern of rewards and sanctions in which social groups operate (Castel, 1991). In relation to international governance, reflecting its idealised nature, one difference between metropolitan and borderland regulation is that the latter is conceived as applying to political regimes as a whole as well as non-territorial units of population that cut across them (the poor, women, migrants, Aids victims, child soldiers). Within control systems, groups and regimes are not seen as having fixed and unchanging capacities; they are aggregates of different potentialities and choices that can be nurtured or discouraged by the power of aid to shape the networks and systems of opportunity within which they operate. Rather than the unfolding of a fixed and immutable essence, through lifetime learning and the freedom to choose, the future is one of self-realisation and constant becoming (Rose, 2000: 234). Conduct is continually monitored and shaped by the governmental logic that is consciously designed into the networks of aid practice involved. The aim of regulatory authority is to modulate behaviour by encouraging or supporting those potentialities or practices that have good or desirable consequences while minimising those that are undesirable. The ethos is one of anticipatory, probabilistic and preventive intervention.

Trying to modulate behaviour in conflict zones through aid practice represents a special case of the liberal problem of 'governing at a distance' (Rose, 2000: 48–9). Given that multitudes of private implementers intervene, how can the calculations of donor governments at the centre translate into actions in the global margins? Before

this is discussed, a related issue needs brief examination. What particular 'way of knowing' is best suited for aid actors wishing to change the conduct of populations? While the imagery of the borderlands legitimates intervention, it does not tell us how technologies of control are operationalised.

Actuarial and risk analysis

The borderlands are understood through a mixture of the actuarial mapping of conduct and the calculable assessment of risk. These complementary modes of representation have been extended to the borderlands in numerous and inter-connected ways. Actuarial analysis attempts to map the borderlands in terms of the behaviour and conduct of the countries concerned. Representing a clear break with cold war logic, the US State Department, for example, has recently developed a new way of categorising the world's states. They have been classified and placed in several categories of 'concern' according to their possession of missile technology and weapons of mass destruction together with their actual or potential ability to destabilise the international system (Berry, 2000). A new Bureau of States has been established to monitor the global scene and update the list annually. Through mapping conduct, the aim of actuarial systems is to help policymakers encourage useful trends while discouraging harmful tendencies. In relation to the US State Department, the position of a country in terms of the ranked categories of concern, provides a guide to the operation of US trade and sanctions policy. The actuarial mapping of conduct is also reflected in the growing tendency for donor governments to concentrate bilateral assistance on those countries believed better to reflect liberal values and practices (Macrae and Leader, 2000). Since aid is now an investment, it makes sense to concentrate it where returns are more likely.

Risk analysis disaggregates conflict zones into various factors of threat and vulnerability. Risk is a way of ordering reality by presenting it in a calculable form thereby allowing it to be governed (Dean, 1999). Apart from providing a calculating rationality that shapes the conduct of individuals, risk analysis provides the tools to manage the public-private networks of aid practice. Risk requires particular forms of knowledge in order to make it thinkable: statistics, sociology, epidemiology, management and accounting. Such ways of knowing are embedded in the relations of international governance in many different ways. It is argued, for example, that poverty does not automatically give rise to conflict. However, it is nonetheless the case that poor countries are more likely to endure war (Saferworld, 1999). In other words, the relationship between poverty and violence is one of probability.

The work of the World Bank's research programme on The Economics of Civil Wars, Crime and Violence, for example, seeks to understand the origins of organised violence in terms of risk. It has compared borderland countries' 'greed' factors such as reliance on primary products, the proportion of young men and its educational endowment with 'grievance' factors such as the degree of factionalism, lack of political rights and economic inequality and has concluded that greed outweighs grievance (Collier, 2000). This is not an ethnographic finding but a statistical one. A country endowed with natural resources, many young men and few opportunities for the educated is more at risk of conflict that one that is not. In this way, risk analysis turns countries and regions into areas of calculable space that can be used to guide policy. NGOs such as International Alert and Saferworld, for example, have made a

cottage industry out of attempting to rank the borderlands in terms of risk factors (Leonhardt, 2000). Understanding of conflict from a risk perspective also underpins the expansion of new surveillance techniques, early warning systems and fora for information exchange.

Techniques of risk assessment and management also extend to the level of the project and the ethical comportment of the aid worker. Shaped by the growing criticism of humanitarian assistance in the mid-1990s, that is, as something capable of causing harm as well as good, risk analysis has taken root in project management. It has transformed projects and programmes into areas of calculable space. For example, since it is now thought that socio-economic disparities are a source of conflict, depending on how aid is managed, it can either entrench divisions or encourage collaboration and social cohesion (op. cit.: 9). Project management has become a process of harm-benefit analysis where decisions are shaped by the consequences actions are presumed to have (O'Brien, 1998). In relation to humanitarian action, there has been a shift from an earlier prevalence of duty-based (deontological) ethics based on the assumption that right actions are right in themselves to a consequentialist (teleological) ethics that subordinates actions to the calculus of possible outcomes (Slim, 1997).

Since the mid-1990s, the emergence of a consequentialist ethics associated with risk analysis has led to a growing number of cases where humanitarian inaction has been judged to be the best, albeit tough, decision (Leader, 1999). This reflects what is known in Britain as the 'new humanitarianism', the sentiments of which are also supported by a number of other European governments. As part of the securitisation of development, humanitarian action is no longer sufficient on its own; it must also contribute to, or at least not contradict, conflict resolution and peace-building efforts. This implies that humanitarian assistance can be conditional on such expectations being met (Short, 1998). The new humanitarianism, while informing donor decision-making, also operates at the level of the project. In numerous micro-locations, consequential calculations of risk result in a continually changing pattern of social inclusion and exclusion within the circuits of aid practice a pattern that combines control with elements of discipline.

Governing the borderlands

Rather than metropolitan states being enfeebled by globalisation, they have repositioned themselves within the collective and, helped by actuarial and risk analysis, are learning to govern at a distance through new and more indirect means. This repositioning involves an institutional and a technical problem. The institutional problem relates to the halting process of organisational reform that the post-cold war securitisation of development has initiated. Operationalising the new security paradigm has involved changes in the division of labour within and between 'aid' and 'political' departments in metropolitan states and multilateral organisations. The technical aspect relates to how metropolitan calculation can be translated into action in the borderlands when a multiplicity of non-state and private associations intervene. New techniques of public management and performance auditing have emerged that provide one way of attempting to manage the public-private networks of aid practice.

Governing institutionally

A key concept underlying the securitisation of aid is reflected in the term 'coherence'. That is, in relation to conflict, coherence means that the different tools of aid and politics, trade and diplomacy and civilian and military initiatives, should work together in the interests of stability and development. The demand for coherence — which now defines the consensus within mainstream aid policy — emerged from the mid-1990s critique of aid and conflict. In countering the ambiguity of humanitarian assistance, it is now required that relief should link with development activities. Since development itself has also been imbued with strategic peace-building powers, the collapse of relief-development distinctions quickly fed into the more general securitisation of aid (Macrae and Leader, 2000). Aid became redefined as part of a coherent or strategic framework bringing together humanitarian action, development, diplomacy, military assistance and private investment into one functioning whole. While most commentaries have focused on the broad descriptions of coherence (for example, OECD, 1998), Macrae and Leader (2000), have analysed the institutional reforms that are taking place to make coherence a reality.

The reuniting of aid and politics has set in motion a wide-ranging if contested process of institutional metropolitan reform. Cold war barriers between 'aid' and 'political' departments have tended to blur and become more equivocal. If Boutros-Ghali's Agenda for Peace (1992) was an early articulation of human security made possible by the securitisation of aid, then the 1997 UN reforms were an attempt to realise this vision institutionally (Macrae and Leader, 2000: 33–5). The American, British and Dutch governments, for example, have also undertaken institutional reforms to bring 'aid' and 'politics' closer together. At the same time, however, a new division of labour is also emerging between these categories. Foreign and defence ministries are tending to retain or develop their authority in those zones of insecurity that retain economic or strategic interest, while aid departments, especially humanitarian departments, have become important players in shaping international policy in the remaining non-strategic areas. Countering the criticism that aid has become a substitute for political action (Higgins, 1993), as Macrae and Leader have argued within this two-tier system '... aid is no longer a *substitute* for political action, it is the primary *form* of international policy at the geo-political periphery' (30–31).

Governing technically

While institutional reform is attempting to give organisational substance to the securitisation of development, the technical problem of linking central calculation with distant application through a multiplicity of private associations remains. Addressing this aspect of governing at a distance involves the introduction of 'new public management', initially developed in relation to the bureaucracies of Northern welfare states, to the public-private networks of aid practice. New public management is associated with accountability: performance indicators, contracts, competition and budgetary parsimony (Rose, 2000: 150). The marketisation of public bodies denotes a shift from the ethics of bureaucracy and public service to that of business and private management. Beginning in the 1980s, Northern governments have reorganised the social state, repackaging much of its bureaucracy into quasi-independent 'cost centres', 'agencies' and 'authorities', privatising and contracting them out to leave a marketised core. These new entities no longer authorise themselves through the ethical claims of

bureaucracy but on the delivery of services and the production of results. They are governed through contracts, targets, performance measures, quality assessments and the regular auditing of conduct.

The fulcrum of governance within new public management is financial. Modes of financial calculation now extend into areas previously accorded professional autonomy. Public accounting has developed a number of powerful technologies for governing at a distance. Complementing the trend toward the calculation of risk as a means of operationalising aid, accounting has transformed institutions themselves and the performance of people within them into aggregates of accountable space. The aim has been to make the actions of erstwhile independent professionals calculable in financial and performance terms. Rather than their own discrete vocabularies, experts now speak the universal language of accounting. While globalisation may have entailed a loosening of the political control of the economy, in the social sphere at least, through the ability to breach professional enclaves in the name of accountability, transparency and quality, Northern states are centralising authority. Government increasingly occurs in new and indirect ways through technologies of performance auditing across private and non-state bodies (Dean, 1999). Social and public accounting has enabled states to:

> ... put in place new techniques of control, strengthening the powers of centres of calculation who set the budgeting regimes, the output targets and the like, reinstating the state in the collective body in a new way and limiting the forms of possible resistance' (Rose, 2000: 147).

Governing the public-private networks of aid practice through performance technologies is somewhat distinct from the privatisation and marketisation of the social state. Aid agencies and NGOs, for example, were never an organic part of the social state. In many respects, while the result is similar, governing at a distance has involved bringing them into the orbit of central calculation rather than farming them out. The critique of humanitarian aid as capable of doing harm as well as good has played a pivotal role in this reforming process of reeling in. The transformation of organisations into areas of calculable space is a double process. It involves the presentation of performance in ways that are measurable by external audit and, at the same time, it needs practitioners that are willing to measure their own conduct in this way. Regarding the latter, part of the process of bringing aid agencies into the remit of central calculation has, paradoxically, been the attempt by NGOs to 'professionalise' themselves by developing their own voluntary codes of conduct, performance indicators and the standardisation of humanitarian provision (Leader, 1998). The Sphere Project, launched in 1997 by several international NGO networks, to develop a set of universal minimum standards in core areas of humanitarian assistance is a good example of one such internal audit (Sphere, 2000).

Performance auditing has not only been developing within aid agencies, more significantly, it has also been developing between them and metropolitan governments and multilateral organisations in the form of new contractual regimes and strategic frameworks. An important innovation has been the emergence of Project Cycle Management (PCM). This affords one way to manage the public-private networks of aid practice. It is a means of translating central calculation into coherent distant action across a multiplicity of private actors. Through negotiation, the basic aims and project objectives are established at the outset. Using a series of intermediate stages involving close collaboration between donors and the implementing agency, the project or

programme is designed and eventually commissioned. Actions are monitored against a consequentialist log-frame of aims and expectations. A final evaluation usually examines impacts and lessons learnt (Leonhardt, 2000: 8). PCM emerged first in relation to development work but, with the rise of the consequentialist ethics of the new humanitarianism, PCM auditing techniques for humanitarian action began to develop during the mid-1990s. By the end of the decade, the European Commission Humanitarian Office (ECHO), one of the largest donors of humanitarian assistance, had augmented its growing range of managerial tools with the introduction of performance indicators (EC, 1999). Compared to the arms-length sub-contracting that characterised the relationship between donors and NGOs during the 1980s, PCM technologies entail a much closer partnership.

Conclusion

A widening range of contractual tools, performance indicators, partnership frameworks and auditing techniques link metropolitan states — in the same way as donor governments — to a growing number of non-state organisations and commercial companies. As a means of governing at a distance, new public management techniques have allowed novel and flexible forms of strategic alliance to emerge that cut across traditional institutional, professional and sector boundaries. The techniques of new public management operationalise the institutional reforms that have resulted from the post-cold war securitisation of development. Rather than the authority of metropolitan states becoming eroded or enslaved by the proliferation of private actors, one has to consider the possibility that such technologies are symptomatic of a reworking of international power and its projection through new non-territorial networks and private systems of calculation. Indeed, despite the rhetoric of decentralisation and self-sufficiency, aid has never been more centralised. The reuniting of aid and politics through the emergence of a global borderland in the form of a potentially dangerous social body has provided much of the urgency for this centralisation. Development, including humanitarian assistance, can consequently no longer be left to chance — it must be coherent, targeted and effective. The mutually reinforcing processes of actuarial and risk mapping, institutional reform and new techniques for managing public-private aid networks furnish the means whereby the borderlands are actively governed and our common destinies shaped. It is essential that the effectiveness, consequences and collateral effects of these technologies of power are interrogated and understood.

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